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Political Trust and Job Insecurity in 18 European Polities 
 
Abstract: Several decades of trust research has confirmed that difficult national 
economic conditions help explain citizens’ low levels of political trust. But research 
points to a much less important role for personal economic factors. The latter finding, 
it is argued, is a result of flawed survey questions and model misspecification. We 
actually know very little about the precise economic concerns that may generate low 
levels of trust and about the mechanisms via which they do so, resulting in a rather 
thin causal story. This paper seeks to address this lacuna, focusing on an issue of 
increasing importance in advanced economies: job insecurity. 
Using individual-level data from 18 European polities at two different time 
points, the paper finds that job insecurity generates lower levels of trust in politicians, 
political parties and political institutions and lower levels of satisfaction with 
democratic performance. Importantly, job insecurity’s effect does not diminish as one 
moves from specific to more diffuse objects of political trust, as previous research 
suggests it should. The paper also finds that the effect of job insecurity is exacerbated 
if citizens have negative perceptions of the performance of the wider economy. 
Finally, and drawing on the occupational psychology literature, the paper proposes a 
novel causal mechanism to link job insecurity to political trust. The intuition is that 
job insecurity violates a ‘psychological-democratic’ trust contract between workers 
and the state. The mechanism is consistent with the observed results. The paper thus 
contributes to both the empirical and theoretical debates on the linkages between 
political trust and economic performance.  
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Political Trust and Job Insecurity in 18 European Polities 
 
Survey data suggest strongly that the relationship between citizens and government is 
fraught. Only 38 percent of the 30,000 citizens surveyed in 25 countries in Edelman’s 
2012 Trust Barometer said they trusted government to do what is right, an 11-point 
decline on the previous year. Forty six percent reported that they do not trust 
government leaders to tell the truth at all. In an even larger study by Gallup in 2005, 
only 13 percent of the 50,000 respondents across 68 countries said they trusted 
politicians. Political distrust is a worldwide phenomenon, found in mature 
democracies, emerging democracies and non-democracies alike. It is also a 
phenomenon that holds across genders, generations, races, religions and socio-
economic groups (Edelman 2012; Gallup polls 2006-07; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
2001; Norris 1999; Nye, Zelikow and King 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000).  
One of the key hypotheses posited by researchers to explain citizens’ distrust 
of politicians, government and the state apparatus is that it is driven by the poor 
performance of political institutions, including legislatures (Feldman 1983; Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 1995; Keele 2007), executives (Citrin and Green 1986; 
Hetherington 1998; Keele 2005) and political parties (Dionne 1991; King 1997; 
Miller 1974a and b).  
A related but narrower hypothesis is that low trust is driven by economic 
underperformance. This can be theorized and measured as actual, objective 
performance and/or perceptions of performance. While objective performance and 
perceptions both matter, the research base demonstrates that perceptions of economic 
performance are generally more important than objective performance criteria when 
seeking to explain differing levels of political trust across individuals (Dalton 2004: 
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64-5, 75, 114-16; Lawrence 1997: 112-13; McAllister 1999). One reason why 
perceptions may matter more is that they are very sensitive to minor shifts in 
aggregate indicators such as growth rates and inflation and personal ones such as 
changes in income (Dalton 2004: 115-16).  
Performance can also be theorized and measured on narrow, personal or 
egotistical criteria and/or on more general, national or sociotropic criteria. Previous 
research again demonstrates that both matter, but not equally. Negative egotistical and 
sociotropic economic evaluations both generate lower levels of political trust (Citrin 
and Green 1986; Hetherington 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001), but perceptions of the 
performance of the national economy are generally regarded as more important than 
perceptions of one’s personal financial situation (Dalton 2004: 116-18; Mishler and 
Rose 2001).  
One problem with the conclusion that personal economic factors are, at best, 
only moderately important predictors of political trust is that it based in large part on a 
survey question long known to be a poor measure of individuals’ changing economic 
situation. Rosenstone and colleagues convincingly demonstrated that ‘pinpointing the 
connection between economic circumstance and political preference’ by asking 
respondents whether they and their families are ‘financially…better off or worse off 
than you were a year ago’ is a ‘perilous enterprise’ because the question constraints 
the response variance (1986: 177). The discipline’s reliance on this and similar 
questions should encourage scepticism about the robustness of empirical results that 
downplay personal economic factors.  
A second problem regards the theoretical linkages between trust and personal 
economic factors. Even if we could be confident that personal economic factors do, at 
least to some extent, predict political trust, we do not know what factors people 
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prioritize or even what criteria they employ when assessing their financial situation in 
response to a prompt by a survey question. Do they think about their level of income, 
changes in income, or income versus expenditure? Perhaps they think about the cost 
of living, or houses they couldn’t afford to buy, or changes at work that put their 
employment and income at risk. We simply do not know. And because we don’t, we 
are left with a rather thin and unsatisfying theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between the economy and trust. The discipline’s broad survey questions 
make it difficult to identify and test the mechanisms linking the two phenomena, 
which are critical to developing a rich causal theory (Hedstrom 2008). 
Third, and most importantly, the failure of personal factors to do much heavy 
lifting in our trust equations may simply be a consequence of model misspecification. 
In other words, analysts may not have included in their models the financial and 
economic factors that are of greatest concern to citizens. In the context of the ongoing 
effects of the global financial crisis, Hacker and his colleagues (2012, 2013) have 
made a persuasive call for researchers to reconsider the roll of personal economic 
experiences and attitudes, and particularly economic insecurity, in shaping political 
behaviour. They show that these experiences and attitudes, when properly 
conceptualised and measured, play a significant role in determining citizens’ attitudes 
towards the role of government.  
Other research, albeit limited in volume, supports Hacker’s findings on the 
importance of insecurity. We know, for example, that in some cases the rise of 
populist political parties, especially on the right, is in part underpinned by increasing 
job insecurity. Populist political parties critique mainstream parties for ignoring 
workers’ concerns about the deleterious effects of international economic integration, 
and the insecure respond by giving these parties their electoral support (Mughan, 
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Bean and McAllister 2004; Mughan and Lacy 2002). Insecurity is also associated with 
the size of, and support for, the welfare state. Countries that are most exposed to 
international trade have bigger governments, probably because citizens demand 
increased social insurance in response to the increased risk posed by economic 
integration (Rodrik 1998). Most studies show that this holds at the individual level, 
with citizens most exposed to insecurity most supportive of the welfare state (Hacker 
et al 2013; Rehm 2009, 2010; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012; but see Mughan 
2007). Insecurity may even be one of the factors determining the changing pattern of 
partisan attachment in the United States and in turn be responsible for the polarization 
of American politics (Rehm 2010). 
In sum, the research base, although quite limited in volume, demonstrates that 
economic insecurity, and particularly job insecurity, plays an important, and perhaps 
increasingly important, role in structuring political attitudes and behaviour across a 
range of polities. Scholarship also points to an important relationship between 
economic underperformance and low levels of political trust. However, little extant 
work has linked these two research agendas and explored the association between job 
insecurity and political trust, despite important micro and macro economic 
developments that have diminished workers’ security (Iversen and Cusack 2000; 
Rehm 2010; Rodrik 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Standing 2011) and evidence 
that insecurity is at the forefront of employees’ minds (OECD 1997: 129-160; 
Pennycook et al 2013). The present paper seeks to address this omission. It tests the 
proposition that job insecurity is associated with low levels of political trust, and finds 
a statistically significant relationship. In a challenge to our existing understanding of 
the economy-trust relationship, the empirical analysis further demonstrates that the 
effect of insecurity on trust does not diminish as the objects of trust become less 
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specific and more diffuse (Norris 1999). A final finding is that insecurity’s effect is 
exacerbated if citizens also have negative perceptions of the performance of the wider 
economy. Building on the work of occupational psychologists, it also proposes a 
novel causal mechanism to link job insecurity and political trust. The basic idea is that 
insecurity violates a psychological-democratic contract in which workers trust 
political actors and institutions and support the democratic process and in return 
expect security in employment. The mechanism is consistent with the observed 
results. The paper thus contributes to the empirical and theoretical debates on the 
linkages between political trust and economic performance.  
The paper proceeds in the following stages. First, it set outs what is meant by 
job insecurity and political trust and introduces the causal mechanism linking the two. 
It then discusses the data and methods that will be employed, before presenting the 
results of the data analysis. It concludes with a discussion of the implications and 
limitations of the main findings.  
 
Defining Political Trust  
Political trust has been defined and measured in many different ways (Citrin and 
Muste 1999; Cook and Gronke 2005; see Hardin 2013 and Mollering 2013 for a 
recent controversy and Levi and Stoker 2000 for a review). One influential definition 
conceives political trust as ‘the degree to which people perceive that government is 
producing outcomes consistent with their expectations’ (Hetherington 2005: 9), but 
survey respondents may have something else in mind when asked about the extent to 
which they trust a particular political actor (Levi and Stoker 2000: 498-499).  
It is also important to recognize that trust is a multi-dimensional concept, 
which can be helpfully disaggregated into its component parts, such as trust in 
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politicians, political parties and various political institutions. Other aspects include 
satisfaction with democratic performance and support for democratic principles. 
These various ‘objects of trust’ can then be arrayed on a dimension from the specific 
to the diffuse (Easton 1965, 1975; Norris 1999). Previous work suggests that the 
effects of economic factors—and, by implication, job insecurity—on political trust 
atrophies as the object of support becomes more diffuse (Dalton 2004: 117-19). This 
may be because the more specific measures tap how things are going now, which 
citizens evaluate via the prism of economic performance generally (Cook and Gronke 
2005: 795-6). 
Distinguishing between the different objects of trust and support is also 
important for the ‘so what?’ question (Citrin and Luks 2001). Generally speaking, 
trust in politicians, political parties and institutions is low in most western 
democracies, but support for regime principles and the political community is 
considerably higher. Scholars have suggested that low levels of political trust in 
politicians can be viewed with some degree of sanguinity, because voters can always 
‘throw the rascals out’ (Citrin 1974; Citrin and Green 1986). Low levels of support for 
regime performance and principles, in contrast, would be a cause of greater concern 
because it may threaten the foundations of democratic societies. Yet throwing the 
rascals out has done little to increase trust in politicians, institutions or democratic 
performance, and Miller’s (1974a and b) argument that distrust is more systemic and 
worrisome looks increasingly pertinent.  
 
Defining Job Insecurity  
As with political trust, there are many different definitions and measures of job 
security. Most have been developed by occupational psychologists who have 
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documented its effects on workers’ well-being (for overviews and definitional 
discussions, see De Witte 1999, 2005 and Sverke et al 2002, 2006). But, at its core, 
job insecurity refers to the threat of losing one’s job (De Witte 2005: 1). It is not the 
same as actual job loss, which is immediate and concrete. Most scholars regard it as a 
subjective and perceptual phenomenon because different people may interpret the 
same objective level of insecurity differently (Sverke et al 2006: 7). Some researchers 
also incorporate affective, involuntary and qualitative aspects of job loss in their 
definitions, but doing so poses problems of measurement operationalization (see 
Ashford et al 1989 for an example). 
Instead, we follow Davy et al (1997: 323) and define job insecurity simply as 
‘one’s expectations about continuity in a job situation’ (see also De Witte 1999; 
Heaney et al 1994; Mohr 2000; and Roskies et al 1993). This captures the cognitive 
and subjective experience of the perceived insecurity of one’s job—and it can thus be 
theorized as an egocentric judgement—but note that it does not encompass the extent 
to which people fear the prospect of losing their job or the extent of concern about 
future employment prospects. Ideally, the definition and measurement of job 
insecurity would tap such affective concerns, because insecurity is likely to have more 
significant behavioural consequences when fear and concern are high, ceteris paribus. 
However, and again, the available data do not facilitate the operationalization of these 
aspects of insecurity.  
 
Linking Job Insecurity and Political Trust 
However job insecurity is defined and operationalized, research clearly demonstrates 
that it matters. Some political consequences of job insecurity were noted in the 
introduction, but it has also been shown to have important consequences for workers 
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and firms. It causes stress inside and outside the workplace and has important 
negative effects on workers’ job satisfaction, physical and mental health, general well-
being and life satisfaction (De Witte 2005; Sverke et al 2002; Sverke et al 2006). It 
has important behavioural consequences for organizations, with insecure workers 
performing worse and more likely to leave. Attitudinal consequences include lower 
levels of commitment to, and trust in, employers (Sverke et al 2002). Ashford et al 
(1989: table 3) identified a correlation of .5 (p<.01) between workers’ job insecurity 
and trust in their employer.
1
 Sverke et al’s meta-analysis identified a similar sized 
effect for job insecurity on workers’ trust in their firm and its managers (2002: tables 
2 and 3). Indeed, job insecurity’s effect on organizational trust was larger than on all 
seven other identified outcomes.
2
  
This effect is particularly intriguing for the present study. Occupational 
psychologists have suggested that job insecurity generates distrust in the firm because 
it breaches the psychological contract between employee and employer. Psychological 
contract theory identifies employees’ perceptions of what they owe their employers 
and what their employers in turn are perceived to owe them (Robinson 1996: 574; 
Rousseau 1989). A key aspect in this perceived mutual obligation is that workers offer 
firms their loyalty and expect to receive job security in return. Job insecurity thus 
                                              
1
 Trust in the ‘employing organization’ was measured using a two-item scale, based 
on responses to the following two questions: ‘I trust this organization to look out for 
my best interests’ and ‘I believe in the top management of this organization’ (Ashford 
et al 1989: 813).  
2
 They examined job security’s effect on job satisfaction, job involvement, 
organizational commitment, physical health, mental health, performance and turnover 
intention, in addition to trust.  
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violates the psychological contract, and workers respond by reducing their loyalty and 
commitment to, and trust in, the firm (De Witte 2005: 3-4). 
It is possible that a similar mechanism operates when workers think about 
political affairs. Our intuition is that (at least some) workers perceive a 
‘psychological-democratic contract’ between themselves and the state, one aspect of 
which is that they trust political actors and institutions and support democratic values 
and expect job security in return. In this thinking, job insecurity violates the 
psychological-democratic contract, and workers respond by reducing their political 
trust. There are other types of insecurity (Hacker 2008), but job insecurity may be 
particularly important to the psychological-democratic contract because work is 
central to individuals’ perception of their self and their place and role in society. 
 Of course, the idea of contract between citizen and state is not new, and can be 
traced back through Rawls, Kant, Rousseau, Locke and Hobbes, among others. But 
discussion of the ‘social contract’ among political philosophers has focused largely on 
questions of consent and obligation, and very little on the content of the contract, 
especially as perceived by individual citizens. The social contract broadly defined 
lacks analytical purchase when seeking to explain political trust, above and beyond 
the idea that citizens are morally entitled to have certain expectations of the state and 
have some obligations in return. The psychological-democratic contract, in contrast, 
identifies one aspect of citizens’ expectations (security) and what happens when the 
state is perceived to have failed (distrust). The psychological-democratic contract is 
breached when citizens perceive their jobs to be insecure and perceive the state to be 
at fault. The argument as to whether the state is actually able in a globalized economy 
to protect citizens’ job security is to some extent moot; what matters is citizens’ 
expectations of the state, not the state’s capacity to fulfil them.  
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Psychological contract theory is additionally appealing because it can be 
mapped onto existing broad-brush theoretical insights into the economy-trust nexus to 
render a more fine-grained explanation. Previously, the main mechanism posited in 
the literature between economics and political trust has been based on the following 
logic: Democratic theory requires citizens to hold governments to account for their 
performance, and economic management is a key performance criterion. At the 
individual-level, economically-challenged citizens should have lower levels of 
political trust because they blame government and other political authorities and 
institutions for their (perceived) predicament. And at the aggregate level, political 
trust will be low and/or decline when economic performance is poor (Clarke, Dutt and 
Kornberg 1993: 1001; Keele 2007: 242). The additional insight of psychological 
contract theory, or psychological-democratic contract theory as proposed here for the 
first time, is that it grounds the breach of the democratic contract specifically in 
workers’ perceptions of their insecurity.  
One important detail, though, is left hanging. It is pertinent to ask what part of 
the state will citizens blame if they feel their job is at risk? A priori, one intuition is 
that it will differ across individuals and political systems. Management theorists and 
occupational psychologists recognize that big firms are very complex organizations 
with many divisions and layers of management, some crossing national boundaries 
and even continents. Different employees may construct different micro psychological 
contracts with different parts of the firm while striking a meta contract with the whole 
(Anderson and Schalk 1998; Cullinane and Dundon 2006). A similar contract 
structure may operate at the level of the political system. Within a single system—a 
federal presidential system, say—some insecure citizens may blame the legislature 
and others the executive, while other may blame state-level institutions. Parliamentary 
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systems may encourage a different division of blame. And there will likely be 
differences even across parliamentary systems, as party systems, voting rules and 
political cultures influence the attribution of blame for perceived contract breaches.  
Additional empirical work is required to address these questions, but extant 
research at least suggests that perceived job insecurity, because it is an egotistical 
assessment of one aspect of a citizen’s financial situation, would likely have a larger 
effect on the more specific political objects, such as trust in politicians and political 
parties (Clarke and Kornberg 1989; Cook and Gronke 2005; Dalton 2004; McAllister 
1999; Norris 1999). In this thinking, insecure workers should blame political 
incumbents, their parties and possibly the political institutions they staff for their 
predicament. Their insecurity should not, though, lead them to question their support 
for the operation of democracy or other more diffuse objects of political support. On 
the other hand, we know from the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that 
humans are loss averse; insecurity thus poses a significant threat to the basic human 
instinct to preserve the status quo A breach of the psychological-democratic contract 
may therefore be regarded by some citizens as so serious as to merit system-level 
consequences. If so, there are, then, good theoretical reasons to suppose that job 
insecurity’s effect will not atrophy as the object of political support moves from the 
specific to the diffuse. This effect would, if observed, challenge our traditional 
understanding of the economy-trust relationship.  
While this modified version of psychological contract theory posits an 
intuitive connection between low political trust and job insecurity, it is impossible 
given the existing data to observe and test the mechanism directly, and this paper does 
not purport to do so. The aim here is, rather, to sketch out the mechanism and to offer 
a plausible causal story, which future research may seek to develop theoretically and 
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test empirically. The best we can do is test whether the mechanism is compatible with 
the results generated by the analysis. The next section turns its attention to the 
empirical correlation between job insecurity and political trust. 
 
Insecurity and Trust: Explaining Individual-Level Differences 
To recap, we have two key hypotheses. The first is that job insecurity reduces 
individuals’ political trust. We test this across a range of objects of political trust. The 
second, which is based on the proposed psychological-democratic contract 
mechanism and poses a challenge to the conventional wisdom, is that the effect of 
insecurity will not diminish as the object of political trust becomes more diffuse.  
 
Data and Variables 
This study’s data sources are Round 2 (2004) and Round 5 (2010) of the multinational 
European Social Survey. The two data sets contain information about respondents’ 
job security and political trust. To facilitate comparisons between the two time points, 
the data analysis is restricted to countries that appear in both ESS rounds, yielding a 
total of eighteen nations: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
3
 
The countries range from the economically advanced old democracies of north 
western Europe, through the relatively new Mediterranean democracies to very new 
democracies of the old Eastern bloc. Some are geographically small while others are 
vast. Some have tiny populations and others large ones. Many are very wealthy but 
                                              
3
 Estonia and Portugal featured in both rounds but were excluded from the analysis 
because of missing data. 
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some are struggling. Some have been relatively sheltered against recent economic 
upheavals in Europe while others are desperately exposed. Some have extensive 
welfare safety nets while others provide only the most basic protections against want, 
disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness, as Beveridge famously described the ‘giant 
evils’ of modern society. The wide cross-national focus and the two time points allow 
us to make broad and robust generalizations about individual-level relationships. 
These results are not sui generis, specific to one or a few nations, but reveal important 
individual-level relationships that operate across different economies, cultures and 
political systems over time.  
Because political trust is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, we follow Norris 
(1999) and utilize five separate dependent variables to measure citizens’ trust. From 
the specific to the diffuse, the five are trust in politicians, political parties, parliament 
and the legal system, and satisfaction with the way democracy works. Unfortunately, 
the ESS surveys do not include questions about Norris’s two most diffuse objects of 
political support—regime principles (such as support for the democratic values) and 
the political community (pride in nation and national identity)—but the variables 
included here can nonetheless be distinguished by the extent of their diffuseness and 
permit the two hypotheses to be tested.  
All the dependent variables are scored on 11-point scales with 0 representing 
no trust at all or extremely dissatisfied and 10 meaning complete trust or extremely 
satisfied.
 4 
The equations were estimated with both OLS and ordinal regressions, but 
for ease of interpretation and presentation only the former are reported here.
5
  
                                              
4
 ‘Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means that 
you have complete trust: the [country’s] parliament; the legal system; politicians; 
political parties.’  ‘And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy 
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Job insecurity, defined above as ‘one’s expectations about continuity in a job 
situation’ (Davy et al 1997: 323), is measured using a question that asks respondents 
whether the statement that ‘my job is secure’ is not at all true, a little bit true, quite 
true or very true. The variable is scored on a four-point scale, with low scores 
representing lower levels of job security. This simple, single-item operationalization 
of job insecurity draws on previous work in psychology (De Witte 1999; Mohr 2000; 
Roskies et al 1993; Wanous et al 1997) and political science (Mughan 2007; Mughan, 
Bean and McAllister 2004: 628-9; Mughan and Lacy 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 
2004). It is worth noting, however, that single-item measures are less likely to deliver 
strong correlations than multi-item scales (Sverke et al 2002: 247, 257), but it is not 
possible to construct a comprehensive multi-item measure using ESS data. 
Operationalizing job security using a single-item measure is inherently conservative, 
at risk of a type II rather than type I error, but in consequence we can be more 
confident that the forthcoming analysis will not generate false positives. 
The analysis also includes a number of control variables. While some trust 
scholars play down the effect of income on political trust (Dalton 2004: 64-5, 75, 114-
                                                                                                                                 
works in [your country]?’ where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 extremely 
satisfied.  
5
 Formally, as the dependent variable is ordinal rather than cardinal, an ordinal 
regression procedure such as ordered probit is more appropriate than OLS. We thus 
compared the base model (with no interactions) from an OLS and from an ordered 
probit and found, first, that the relative size and significance of all coefficients was 
similar in both models and, second and more importantly, the estimated thresholds 
were spaced equally, suggesting any inconsistencies with OLS would be very small. 
We thus decided to retain the OLS model as this facilitates the easy use and 
interpretation of interaction terms, which are problematic to operationalize in non-
linear models.  
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6; McAllister 1999), it is necessary to include it here because income is likely to 
moderate the effect of insecurity on trust, with higher earners more secure in their 
employment and better insulated against the negative consequences of job loss than 
lower earners (Rehm 2009, 2010; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012; Sverke et al 
2006: 10). The model includes a measure of each household’s total net income (after 
tax and compulsory deductions) from all sources. To address the problem of differing 
income levels across nations, the variable divides each household’s income into one 
of ten country-specific deciles. The poorest ten percent in Slovakia are coded the 
same as the poorest ten percent in Norway and Germany, even though their objective 
income levels differ dramatically.   
It is common when modelling determinants of political support to control for 
education, and it is particularly important in this case because skill levels rise with 
years of education, and skills, ceteris paribus, offer protection against and 
opportunities in the internationalized economy (Walter 2010; Sverke et al 2006: 10). 
The better educated should face lower levels of job insecurity, and will thus have 
higher levels of political trust than those with less education. Moreover, it is important 
to control for education to guard against a spurious relationship between trust and 
insecurity, because education is likely to have independent direct effects on both 
political support and job insecurity. Education is measured by years of full-time 
education completed. 
The model also includes a variable that measures respondents’ perceptions of 
the wider economy, which are statistically significant in most existing trust research. 
And, of course, it is important to include sociotropic evaluations as a control to avoid 
the job insecurity variable being contaminated by concerns about the perceived 
performance of the wider economy. The variable measures the extent to which 
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respondents are satisfied with the present state of the economy in their country on an 
11-point scale, with low scores representing dissatisfaction.  
While income, education and sociotropic economic evaluations are included as 
controls, it was suggested above that the effect of job insecurity may be conditional on 
the level of each of these variables. The consequences of losing one’s job are likely to 
be more severe for the poorly educated and the poor and when the wider economy is 
performing poorly. The ill-educated and the indigent are particularly exposed to the 
vagaries of the modern, internationalized labour market, because many of their jobs 
have been outsourced or are in some way threatened, while a poorly performing 
national economy makes it more difficult to find a good new job. To accommodate 
these possible conditional effects, the model is rerun with three additional variables 
that explore the potential interactions between job insecurity and income, education 
and the wider economy. The details are set out below.  
Controls for age and gender are also included in the models. The data are 
weighted to ensure that each country’s sample is a true representative sample of its 
wider population. The data are also weighted to account for population size. This is 
important when analyzing multiple countries simultaneously. Failing to weight for 
size would result in skewed estimates, with smaller countries over-represented.
6
  
                                              
6
 The unweighted sample sizes for each country in 2004 are: Belgium 1,778; Czech 
Republic 3,026; Demark 1,487; Finland 2,022; France 1,806; Germany 2,870; Greece 
2,406; Hungary 1,498; Ireland 2,286; Netherlands 1,881; Norway 1,760; Poland 
1,716; Slovakia 1,512; Slovenia 1,442; Spain 1,663; Sweden 1,948; Switzerland 
2,141; and United Kingdom 1,897. And for 2010: Belgium 1,704; Czech Republic 
2,386; Demark 1,576; Finland 1,878; France 1,728; Germany 3,032; Greece 2,715; 
Hungary 1,561; Ireland 2,576; Netherlands 1,829; Norway 1,549; Poland 1,751; 
Slovakia 1,856; Slovenia 1,403; Spain 1,885; Sweden 1,497; Switzerland 1,506; and 
United Kingdom 2,422. 
Page 17 of 42
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjtr


































































a. Descriptive Statistics 
Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, it is instructive to examine the mean 
levels of political support for each of the five dependent variables by country and 
collectively. Table 1 reports the relevant statistics for 2004 and 2010. Reflecting 
Norris’s (1999) findings, the weighted averages in the last rows show that political 
trust generally increases as one moves from specific to more diffuse objects. 
Politicians and political parties, the most political of Norris’s regime institutions, are 
the least trusted. Parliaments are more highly trusted. Legal systems, the least political 
of Norris’s regime institutions, are the most trusted. Finally, more people than not are 
satisfied with the operation of democracy across the 18 nations at both time points. 
   [Table 1 about here] 
The mean of the means columns provide an easy way to compare political 
trust across countries and are used to rank each nation. The Nordic countries of 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden generally top the trust league in 2004 and 
2010. The other old democracies of north western Europe (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) are in the 
middle of the league, although Switzerland stands out as a high trusting country 
within this group. The Mediterranean polities of Spain and Greece, both suffering 
economic privation and themselves not long out of dictatorship, join the former 
Eastern bloc countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) at 
the bottom.  
Comparing the two time points, political trust has on average fallen slightly on 
four of the five dimensions (and increased only in legal systems), although this 
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conceals some notable increases in support in Poland, Sweden, Norway and the 
Netherlands, and some substantial falls in Greece, Spain and Ireland (see final column 
in the 2010 results in table 1 for change in mean scores over time). Unsurprisingly, 
given the economic and political turmoil wrought by its sovereign debt crisis and the 
austerity that followed, the collapse in political trust in Greece is particularly steep, 
declining by 50 percent from 4.67 points to 2.31 points (on an 11-point scale) and 
catapulting it from a mid-table position to last in the league.   
b. Multivariate Base Model 
Table 2 reports the results of the initial multivariate analysis on the 2004 and 2010 
data. The model includes job insecurity and five control variables. It is run ten times, 
once for each of the five measures of political trust at both time points. The coding of 
these variables is described above and summarized in the table. The model is a fixed 
effects model and includes 17 dummy variables, one for each of the countries 
included in the analysis, with Germany excluded as the reference.
7
 The dummies 
control for unobserved country-specific factors—such as macroeconomic conditions 
and political culture—that may be correlated with the variables in regression. The 
coefficients and statistics for job security and the control variables thus measure 
individual-level within-country variation and not differences between countries.
8
 For 
                                              
7
 Multilevel modelling is neither necessary nor appropriate in this case. It is not 
necessary because the fixed effects model generates robust estimates for reasons 
stated in the main text and accompanying footnotes. It is not appropriate because 
econometric analysis suggests strongly that at least 50 level 2 (country) observations 
are required (Maas and Hox 2005; Clarke et al 2010 provide an excellent discussion 
of the relative merits and demerits of fixed effects and multilevel approaches), and 
also because the analysis seeks to control cross-national heterogeneity, not explain it.  
8
 The fixed effects model is also robust to the issue that unobserved factors may be 
correlated strongly within countries. Failure to control for this potential correlation 
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presentational reasons, the country dummies’ coefficients and statistics are not 
included in the tables, but are available on request. As noted above, the equations 
were estimated using both OLS and ordinal regression, but for ease of interpretation 
and presentational clarity only the OLS results are reported and discussed here. 
   [Table 2 about here] 
The results confirm the first hypothesis. Job insecurity is statistically 
significant in all five 2004 equations, and the coefficients are correctly signed. 
Individuals with higher levels of perceived job security are more trusting of 
politicians, political parties, parliament and the legal system and more satisfied with 
the operation of democracy than individuals who think their job is at risk. Job 
insecurity is also statistically significant and correctly signed in four of the five 2010 
equations. It is correctly signed in the trust in parliament equation but falls outside 
generally recognized bounds of significance.  
But what of the size of job insecurity’s effect across the different objects 
political trust? Contrary to expectations generated by previous research, but 
confirming the second hypothesis, its effect does not diminish as one moves from 
specific to more diffuse support. Indeed, in 2004 its effect is largest on trust in legal 
systems, theorized here as the least political regime institution. And in 2010 its effect 
is largest on satisfaction with the operation of democracy, our most diffuse object of 
support. This finding offers tentative support for the idea that job insecurity violates a 
psychological-democratic contract in which workers trust political actors and 
institutions and have faith in the democratic system so long as they deliver adequate 
security in return. 
                                                                                                                                 
could bias the estimates of the standard errors, even if these unobserved factors are 
uncorrelated with any of the regressors.  
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More broadly, the size of job insecurity’s effect does not change markedly 
across the different measures and objects of political trust and both time points, 
hovering around .05 on average. In other words, a one unit increase on the four-point 
job insecurity scale would produce a .05 unit increase on the eleven point political 
trust scales. 
Education and sociotropic economic evaluations are statistically significant (at 
p=<.001) and correctly signed in all ten equations across the two time points, with 
better educated individuals and those more positive about the wider economy having 
higher levels of political trust. Income is correctly signed and statistically significant 
in three of the 2004 equations and four of the 2010 equations. When it comes to the 
size of the effects, most notable is the contribution of perceptions of the wider 
economy to political trust. Because both sociotropic evaluations and political support 
are scored on 11-point scales, the unstandardized B coefficients are easily 
interpretable. If everyone in the 18 countries moved from being completely 
dissatisfied with their nation’s economic performance to completely satisfied in 2010, 
trust in politicians would have been 41 percentage points higher and satisfaction with 
democratic performance 47 points higher, averaging across the range of the other 
variables. Sociotropic evaluations are by far the most important factor determining 
political trust in this model.  
Still, the importance of the sociotropic evaluations does not undermine the fact 
that job insecurity is also statistically significant. Across a wide range of political 
systems and cultures and two time points, citizens who perceive their jobs to be 
insecure exhibit lower levels of political trust than those who are more confident 
about their job security. Moreover, the effect of insecurity does not diminish as one 
moves from specific to more diffuse trust objects.  
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c. Base Model plus Interaction Terms 
The coefficients and statistics for job insecurity in the multivariate base model 
represent its average effect across the average levels of the other independent 
variables. However, job insecurity’s effect may vary across the levels of the other 
variables. As discussed above, there is good reason to suppose that it may be 
conditional on citizens’ level of income, education and sociotropic economic 
evaluations. Job insecurity is likely to hit the lower paid and less educated harder than 
the better paid and educated, and those who are pessimistic about the wider 
economy’s performance may worry about job security more than those who are 
positive about the economy. The base model was thus rerun with three interaction 
terms to capture the extent to which income, education and the wider economy 
condition the effect of job insecurity on political trust.
9
  
   [Table 3 about here] 
The relevant statistics for the interaction model are recorded in table 3. The 
data analysis returns 30 interaction coefficients across the three variables, five 
equations, and two time points. Only one coefficient (job security x education in the 
democracy equation) is statistically significant (p=.034) in the 2004 data. In this case, 
the slope of political support on job security will decrease by .011 for every additional 
year in education. In other words, job insecurity is less important as a predictor of 
                                              
9
 The three interaction terms were constructed using mean-centred variables. The 
coefficients represent simple conditional effects, not main or average effects as per the 
base model. See Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005) and Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) for 
discussions about variable coding and coefficient interpretation in interaction models. 
The base model above was run separately to the interaction term model in order to 
first facilitate a clear interpretation of job insecurity’s average effects, before 
proceeding to explore the product terms’ effects.  
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political support when education is high and more important when it is low. The 
inference is that education helps guard against the risks associated with job insecurity.  
In the 2010 data, education significantly moderates the effect of job insecurity 
in the parties equation and income is a statistically significant moderator in the 
democracy equation, but these moderators are otherwise insignificant. A much clearer 
pattern emerges with sociotropic economic evaluations. The job security x economic 
evaluations interaction term is statistically significant in the politicians, parties, 
parliament and democracy equations. The negative signs on the coefficients reveal 
that perceptions of job insecurity increase in importance as a predictor of political 
trust as evaluations of the wider economy worsen. And the coefficients themselves 
estimate the change in the slope of political trust on job insecurity given a unit 
increase in evaluations of the wider economy. For example, the slopes of both trust in 
parliament and satisfaction with the operation of democracy on job insecurity are 
estimated to decrease by .029 when sociotropic economic evaluations increase by one 
unit.  
   [Figure 1 about here] 
However, it is important to note that this effect pertains only when economic 
evaluations and the other control variables are at their means. To calculate the change 
in the slope of political trust on job insecurity at other levels of economic evaluations, 
the regression equation is rerun with evaluations centred at appropriate levels of 
interest—here at the maximum and minimum values and at one standard deviation 
above and below the mean (see Jaccard and Turrisi 2003: 31-32). Figure 1 displays 
the marginal effects of job insecurity on political trust at different levels of economic 
evaluations. The regression lines are positive (and statistically significant—see 
appendix for details) when people are dissatisfied with the wider economy but flatten 
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out as economic perceptions improve and, relatedly, the vertical distance between the 
regression lines is narrower at higher levels of job security and wider at lower levels. 
This means that job insecurity matters more as a predictor of political trust when 
people are both insecure about their employment and simultaneously feel negatively 
about the wider economy.  
 
Discussion  
At a time of great economic transition, scholars are only just beginning to scratch the 
surface of the political effects of job insecurity. This paper is one of the first to 
explore one aspect of this relationship—that is, job insecurity’s effects on political 
trust—in an empirical manner and comparative perspective. It has tested the effect of 
job insecurity across different objects of political trust, two time points and eighteen 
countries. That job insecurity was significant across all objects of trust and time points 
in the aggregated country analysis suggests that the causal connection is pretty robust. 
We can say with some confidence that job insecurity causes individuals to be less 
trusting of politicians, political parties, parliament and the legal system across a wide 
variety of polities.  
Job insecurity also leads people to be less satisfied with the operation of the 
democracy. This finding challenges previous work (Clarke and Kornberg 1989; Cook 
and Gronke 2005; Dalton 2004; McAllister 1999; Norris 1999) that suggests that the 
effects of personal economic dislocation should dissipate as the object of political 
trust becomes more diffuse and less obviously political.  
The paper provides some first tentative support to the idea that (at least some) 
workers enter into a psychological contract not just with their employers (De Witte 
2005: 3-4; Robinson 1996: 574) but with the state, in which the state is expected to 
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provide job security and is rewarded with political trust. When the state is perceived 
to have reneged on that contract, trust declines. While the empirical results are 
consistent with this interpretation of the mechanism linking perceived insecurity to 
political trust, this process could not be observed directly. Of course, this is not 
unusual in the social sciences, wherein causal mechanisms are frequently theorised 
but rarely observed (Hedstrom 2008). Future work could perhaps utilize experimental 
methods as a way to reveal some of the undoubtedly complex causal processes linking 
job insecurity and other likely predictors to low levels of political trust, thus enriching 
our understanding of these important relationships.  
That job insecurity has a significant effect on workers’ evaluations of the 
operation of democracy should prick the ears of politicians and political scientists. 
Absent any serious efforts to protect workers and their families—perhaps in the form 
of expanded welfare safety nets, greater protection against arbitrary dismissal or 
concerted attempts to up-skill vulnerable workers—the early years of the twenty-first 
century could witness a further decline in political support, not just in trust in 
politicians and political and non-political institutions but also in satisfaction with the 
way democracy functions. It raises the spectre that a contemporary downturn in job 
security could possibly threaten the democratic foundations of post-industrial 
societies. Consider again the results of the interaction model. The interaction of job 
insecurity and perceptions of the wider economy was not statistically significant in 
any of the five 2004 models, a time when most European economies were performing 
quite well. In 2010, as these same economies struggled with sovereign debt crises, 
stagnant or shrinking economies, high unemployment and austerity policies, the same 
product term was statistically significant across four objects of political trust, 
including the operation of democracy.  
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To be sure, the analysis could not test the impact of insecurity on Norris’s 
most diffuse objects of political support. The requisite data are not available. Further 
efforts at data collection may wish to address this, because the potential consequences 
are important. We now know that job insecurity is having a negative effect on 
citizens’ evaluations of politicians and institutions and how well democracy is 
working, but it could possibly also threaten their commitment to democratic values 
and the wider political community.    
Further globalization, deindustrialization, technological change and de-
unionization will all likely increase the labour market insecurity of some individuals 
(Iversen and Cusack 2000; Rehm 2010; Rodrik 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; 
Standing 2011) and therefore lead directly to a further decline in aggregate levels of 
political trust. And the effects of job insecurity will likely be even greater in poorly 
performing economies because of the interaction between insecurity and perceptions 
of the health of the national economy.
10
 Until now, it is possible that the negative 
effects of job insecurity on political trust may have been mitigated to some extent by 
global economic growth, with insecurity traded off against increased wealth. But that 
equilibrium may no longer hold. Political trust is at the mercy of job insecurity, 
economic performance and their interaction. Exhibit A is of course Greece, but 
similar trends can be observed in Spain and Ireland (see table 1), and possibly 
                                              
10
 According to ESS data, job security declined between 2004 and 2010 by 23 
percentage points in Ireland and, from a lower base, 18 points in Greece and Portugal. 
But it is likely that job insecurity has grown and political trust fallen since the ESS 
collected its data in 2010. The Eurozone crisis peaked in mid 2012. The huge IMF and 
ECB loans taken on by Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and others and the 
accompanying austerity programs have exacerbated already difficult economic 
conditions (Peston 2013).  
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Portugal, Italy and elsewhere, where economic retrenchment continues and even 
worsens in response to the global financial crisis.  
One question left hanging in the present paper is whether job insecurity can 
help explain fluctuations in political trust over time. The empirical analysis found that 
individual-level differences in insecurity translate into different levels of political trust 
across individuals, but could the increase in insecurity that many analysts argue has 
accompanied the global integration of national economies be responsible for the 
decline in political trust that appears to have affected most democratic polities? The 
trust literature has demonstrated that subjective perceptions—and objective indicators 
to a lesser extent—of personal and general economic performance are statistically 
significant predictors of over-time trends in trust. However, the size of the effects 
were often found to be modest. In part, this is because the economy has an 
asymmetrical relation to trust. When economic times are bad, trust takes a big hit, but 
it does not recover when times are good (Clarke and Kornberg 1989: 262-3; 
Hetherington and Rudolph 2008). Following this logic, increasing job insecurity, 
especially if accompanied by worsening sociotropic economic conditions, may drive 
political trust down, but improving job security and economic conditions may not help 
trust recover. However, it is very difficult to test such a proposition. It is outside of the 
remit of this short paper and future research may be constrained by the lack of good 
data. Cross-sectional surveys frequently provide a wide range of variables to enable 
analysts to explore individual-level differences in detail, but the same variables are 
rarely available over a longer time period. It is even rarer that the same people are 
asked the same questions over time, even though such panel studies are one of the 
best ways to explore change over time and to make robust causal inferences. And it is 
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rarer still that the panels are cross-national in character. Given the importance of the 
questions at hand, better data are clearly required.  
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Marginal Effects: Job Security on Political Trust at Various Levels of Sociotropic Economic 
Evaluations 
 
1. Job Security on Trust in Politicians  
Economic Evaluations Intercept B1 Job Security (SE) Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Minimum .725 .110 (.034) .001 .044 .176 
Low (1SD < mean) 1.455 .081 (.024) .001 .034 .128 
Average (at mean) 2.444 .041 (.019) .027 .005 .078 
High (1SD > mean) 3.434 .001 (.027) .959 -.051 .054 
Maximum 4.868 -.056 (.048) .244 -.151 .038 
      
2. Job Security on Trust in Political Parties  
Economic Evaluations Intercept B1 Job Security (SE) Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Minimum 1.317 .150 (.033) .000 .084 .215 
Low (1SD < mean) 1.969 .113 (.024) .000 .066 .160 
Average (at mean) 2.853 .064 (.018) .001 .027 .100 
High (1SD > mean) 3.737 .014 (.027) .598 -.038 .066 
Maximum 5.017 -.058 (.048) .226 -.151 .036 
      
3. Job Security on Trust in Parliament  
Economic Evaluations Intercept B1 Job Security (SE) Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Minimum 1.693 .135 (.036) .000 .064 .205 
Low (1SD < mean) 2.456 .018 (.007) .014 .003 .032 
Average (at mean) 3.468 .016 (.020) .417 -.023 .055 
High (1SD > mean) 4.490 -.052 (.029) .069 -.108 .004 
Maximum 5.971 -.151 (.051) .003 -.252 -.050 
      
4. Job Security on Trust in Legal System  
Economic Evaluations Intercept B1 Job Security (SE) Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Minimum 3.759 .078 (.037) .037 .005 .151 
Low (1SD <mean) 4.407 .058 (.027) .029 .006 .111 
Average (at mean) 5.286 .031 (.021) .128 -.009 .072 
High (1SD >mean) 6.165 .005 (.030) .874 -.054 .063 
Maximum 7.438 -.034 (.053) .524 -.139 .071 
      
5. Job Security on Satisfaction with Operation of Democracy  
Economic Evaluations Intercept B1 Job Security (SE) Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Minimum  2.421 .157 (.036) .000 .086 .227 
Low (1SD < mean) 3.278 .106 (.026) .000 .055 .156 
Average (at mean) 4.440 .037 (.020) .066 -.002 .076 
High (1SD > mean) 5.603 -.032 (.029) .263 -.089 .024 
Maximum 7.288 -.132 (.052) .011 -.234 -.031 
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Figure 1. Marginal effect of job security on political trust at different levels of sociotropic 
economic evaluations, 2010 data 
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Table 1. Political Trust Mean Scores, 2004 and 2010, Ranked by Mean of the Means 
 
2004 Politicians  Political 
Parties  




Mean of the 
Means 
       
1. Denmark 5.59 5.65 6.29 7.21 7.31 6.41 
2. Finland 4.88 5.00 6.01 6.90 6.70 5.90 
3. Switzerland 4.77 4.64 5.52 6.14 6.39 5.49 
4. Norway 4.24 4.34 5.42 6.35 6.23 5.32 
5. Sweden 4.19 4.40 5.35 5.77 5.91 5.12 
6. Netherlands 4.69 4.80 4.67 5.50 5.66 5.06 
7. Belgium 4.24 4.29 4.68 4.83 5.56 4.72 
8. Ireland 3.92 3.97 4.71 5.21 5.73 4.70 
9. Greece 3.59 3.51 4.69 5.38 6.19 4.67 
10. Spain 3.68 3.67 5.09 4.72 6.07 4.65 
11. UK 3.59 3.68 4.29 5.12 5.14 4.36 
12. Germany 3.23 3.18 4.21 5.54 5.28 4.29 
13. France 3.51 3.39 4.27 4.76 4.85 4.16 
14. Slovenia 3.10 3.21 4.13 3.85 4.54 3.76 
15. Hungary 2.68 2.71 3.63 4.43 4.10 3.51 
16. Czech Rep. 2.73 2.74 3.19 3.72 4.63 3.40 
17. Slovakia 2.53 2.66 3.05 3.58 3.84 3.13 
18. Poland 1.92 1.89 2.40 3.01 3.70 2.58 
Weighted 
Average 
3.43 3.43 4.26 4.94 5.20 4.25 
 
2010 Politicians  Political 
Parties  








        
1. Denmark 5.04 5.17 5.83 7.35 6.94 6.07 -.34 
2. Sweden 5.04 5.11 6.28 6.53 6.75 5.94 .82 
3. Norway 4.94 4.93 6.02 6.85 6.93 5.93 .61 
4.Switzerland 5.01 4.81 5.80 6.28 7.07 5.79 .30 
5.Netherlands 5.25 5.26 5.37 5.89 6.18 5.59 .53 
6. Finland 4.43 4.54 5.38 6.91 6.26 5.50 -.40 
7. Belgium 3.86 3.85 4.46 4.93 5.20 4.46 -.26 
8. Germany 3.37 3.36 4.31 5.68 5.31 4.41 .12 
9. UK 3.43 3.52 4.11 5.24 4.97 4.25 -.11 
10. Ireland 3.11 3.07 3.68 5.10 4.94 3.98 -.72 
11. France 3.21 3.09 4.15 4.94 4.24 3.93 -.23 
12. Hungary 3.12 3.15 4.22 4.64 4.42 3.91 .40 
13. Spain 2.74 2.71 4.29 4.41 5.10 3.85 -.80 
14. Poland 2.66 2.55 3.44 4.26 5.04 3.59 1.01 
15.Czech Rep 2.62 2.69 3.28 4.14 4.85 3.52 .12 
16. Slovakia 2.78 2.71 3.20 3.52 4.17 3.28 .15 
17. Slovenia 2.25 2.24 2.98 3.08 3.20 2.75 -1.01 
18. Greece 1.35 1.37 2.04 3.83 2.98 2.31 -2.36 
Weighted 
Average 
3.33 3.31 4.22 5.11 5.06 4.21 -.04 
 
Political trust mean scores scored on 0-10 scale, with zero representing no trust at all (in politicians, political 
parties, parliament and the legal system) or extremely dissatisfied (with the operation of democracy) and ten 
representing complete trust or extremely satisfied. Ns vary by country and object of political support 
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Table 2. Explaining Political Trust Across 18 European Countries, 2004 and 2010 
 
 Politicians Political Parties Parliament Legal System Operation of Democracy 
 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 
































































































































































































Sociotropic economic evaluations 









































           
Adjusted R
2 
.276 .272 .272 .262 .297 .258 .254 .221 .326 .291 
N 10,310 11,612 10,268 11,604 10,270 11,575 10,301 11,609 10,260 11,583 
 
***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05 (2-tail tests) 
B cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients in a fixed effects model (seventeen country dummies included in model, but not shown, with Germany excluded 
as reference). Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables scored on 0-10 scale with zero representing no trust at all and ten representing complete trust, except for 
operation of democracy where zero represents extremely dissatisfied and ten represents extremely satisfied. See main text for question wording for all variables 
 
Page 41 of 42
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjtr





























































For Peer Review Only
Table 3. Explaining Political Trust Across 18 European Countries, 2004 and 2010, Including Interaction Terms 
 
 Politicians Political Parties Parliament Legal System Operation of Democracy 
 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 










































































































































































































Sociotropic economic evaluations 

















































































































           
Adjusted R
2 
.276 .272 .272 .262 .297 .258 .254 .221 .326 .292 
N 10,310 11,612 10,268 11,604 10,270 11,575 10,301 11,609 10,260 11,583 
 
***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05 (2-tail tests) 
B cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients in a fixed effects model (seventeen country dummies included in model, but not shown, with Germany excluded 
as reference). Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables scored on 0-10 scale with zero representing no trust at all and ten representing complete trust, except for 
operation of democracy where zero represents extremely dissatisfied and ten represents extremely satisfied. See main text for question wording for all variables. Education, 
income, job security and sociotropic economic evaluations are mean centered. See main text for question wording for all variables 
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